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Few things stimulate a sector more than the visible flow of public funding. That is precisely the case with defence, now in full swing, as national and European funds pour into the industry in response to the terrible wars ravaging much of the world. Companies that were not previously involved are entering the field, while established players are repositioning themselves to capture as much of this momentum as possible. EY described it as a historic opportunity in its study of the defence industry. Or perhaps not, because unless the necessary structures are put in place, it will amount to little more than wishful thinking, a midsummer night’s dream, and in the medium and long term we will pay the price for failing to act properly.

This moment represents a historic opportunity for defence as a whole: for the Armed Forces, the defence industry, defence policy, and even for public awareness of defence. It could mark a turning point in both strategic and operational concepts, prompting the reformulation of doctrines, legislation, procedures, and structures to adapt our system to the operational environment that has taken hold globally, one defined by diverse and evolving threats, by actors we were not even considering a decade ago, and by the concept of “extended defence” promoted by the European Commission. It is also a moment shaped by the coming financial surge, because managing abundance is far more complex than managing scarcity, and unless we implement meaningful reforms, we will not be able to manage this windfall effectively.

To begin with, the Ministry’s current structure, despite adjustments to the evolving industrial landscape and the recruitment of personnel from Isdefe and various headquarters, not without some disruption, lacks the capacity to absorb an annual budget of €40 billion (under the current scenario and with commitments to further medium-term investment). Nor will it be easy for industry to manage the scale of orders now being placed on the table. Doing so will require expanded industrial capacity and the incorporation of highly skilled labour, neither of which can be achieved overnight.

The government has launched 79 programmes worth €28 billion, a bold undertaking with both strengths and weaknesses. This effort must strike a balance between the short term (the immediate acquisition of capabilities, which confronts us with the reality that operating at a distance from the United States and Israel complicates matters considerably), the medium term (through the Special Modernisation Programmes (PEMs)), and the long term, focused on developing sovereign capabilities, particularly in technological domains that are less visible in the current investment push, such as quantum technologies and artificial intelligence.

There is a dangerous illusion at play: the belief that there is abundant money in defence. In reality, liquid funding is limited, and in the absence of approved national budgets, the seams of the current defence system are beginning to show strain. It is imperative not to neglect day-to-day operations, including the maintenance and sustainment of existing systems, a task made increasingly difficult without a General State Budget and one that is already creating challenges for the Armed Forces.

At this juncture, several realities must be addressed, focusing on the pillars that will underpin both the immediate future and long-term development:

Operational effectiveness is the priority, and industry must adapt to the needs of the Armed Forces, not the other way around.

The Armed Forces must adapt their structures to the new operational reality with agility and resolve. An oversized senior structure combined with limited flexibility in the emerging world order will reduce operational effectiveness and responsiveness.

Both the public administration and industry must become more agile, flexible, and efficient. The Armed Forces cannot afford to wait for bureaucratic processes to unfold at their current pace, nor for industry to produce at existing rates, if they are to avoid receiving systems that are already obsolete upon delivery.

Public-private cooperation in investment and in the transfer of capabilities from the civilian to the military domain must be effectively structured and coordinated.

Legislative reform is essential, including amendments to the Public Sector Contracts Act, the National Defence Act, the Military Career Act (personnel issues merit separate discussion), and the General State Budget Act. In the immediate term, the Ministerial Order on Defence Planning must be updated, a critical issue given that the current framework dates back to 2015, which repealed Ministerial Order 37/2005 signed by José Bono.

We are undoubtedly facing a historic opportunity. Or perhaps not — it all depends on how it is managed.